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Abstract 
This paper finds a strong empirical link between domestic banking sector 
competitiveness and de facto international integration. De-facto international integration 
is measured through a new index of financial integration, which measures, for deviations 
from covered interest parity, the size of no-arbitrage bands and the speed of arbitrage 
outside the no-arbitrage band. The strong empirical link between de-facto integration and 
domestic financial sector competitiveness allows us to reinterpret the recent literature on 
the benefits and costs of international financial integration. This literature has emphasized 
the development of domestic markets as a precondition to benefiting from international 
integration. This paper offers an alternative view. Lack of competition in domestic 
financial systems may prevent countries from reaping the benefits of international 
integration simply because it prevents them from being integrated in a meaningful way – 
that of price equalization. This finding suggests that financial sector consolidation of the 
type recently witnessed in the crisis environment may have negative consequences for 
countries’ de-facto international financial integration. Another important result of the 
paper is that the level of de-jure controls have a limited association with de-facto 
integration, particularly for developing economies. 
JEL classification: F32, G15, G21 
Bank classification: Econometric and statistical methods; Financial markets; 
International topics 
Résumé 
Notre étude montre qu’il existe un lien empirique étroit entre la compétitivité du secteur 
bancaire national et l’intégration effective à l’échelle internationale. Cette dernière est 
mesurée à l’aide d’un nouvel indice qui permet de calculer, pour des écarts par rapport à 
la parité des taux d’intérêt avec couverture, la taille des zones de non-arbitrage et la 
rapidité de l’arbitrage en dehors de ces zones. La force du lien empirique entre 
l’intégration effective et la compétitivité du secteur financier national nous permet de 
réinterpréter la littérature récente sur les coûts et les avantages de l’intégration financière 
internationale. Cette littérature présente le développement des marchés intérieurs comme 
une condition préalable à la capacité de bénéficier de l’ouverture mondiale. Notre étude 
offre un point de vue différent. Le manque de concurrence au sein des systèmes 
financiers nationaux empêche certains pays de tirer parti de l’intégration internationale 
tout simplement parce qu’ils sont privés d’un avantage significatif de l’intégration, à 
savoir l’égalisation des prix. Ce résultat donne à penser qu’une intégration financière 
semblable à celle qui a été observée au cours de la récente crise peut avoir des 
conséquences négatives pour l’intégration financière effective à l’échelle mondiale. Autre 
résultat important, nous constatons que l’étendue des restrictions officielles n’a qu’un lien 
limité avec le degré d’intégration effective, surtout dans les économies en 
développement. 
Classification JEL : F32, G15, G21 
Classification de la Banque : Méthodes économétriques et statistiques; Marchés 
financiers; Questions internationales In a friction free world, the decrease in domestic banking sector competi-
tion does not inﬂuence a country’s international ﬁnancial integration. In such
a world, the global ﬁnancial sector is eﬀectively the domestic ﬁnancial sector
and complete price convergence occurs. However, in the presence of real-world
frictions like asymmetric information or capital controls, that prevent full access
of domestic agents to international ﬁnancial markets, the degree of monopoly
power in domestic banking sector becomes an important determinant of the
degree of price convergence between the domestic and the global ﬁnancial mar-
kets. While there is some literature (discussed in section 1) that deals with the
theoretical link between competitiveness in the domestic banking sector and
international integration in the presence of real world frictions, the empirical
strength of this link has not been adequately explored.1 In this paper, I use a
novel measure of de-facto integration and ﬁnd that, particularly for emerging
and developing economies, the empirical link between domestic banking sector
competitiveness and de-facto international integration is strong. This result has
important policy implications. Countries with partially open capital accounts
should see greater price convergence with international markets if they liberal-
ized their domestic banking sector, even without opening it to foreign players.
Countries with less than fully open capital accounts may also further restrict
ﬂows of international capital without appearing to do so, through tightening
domestic banking regulation. The result that ﬁnancial sector consolidation has
negative consequences for a country’s de-facto integration also implies that the
banking sonsolidation during the recent global ﬁnancial crisis may have a detri-
mental eﬀect on the extent of global ﬁnancial integration.
Another important result of the paper relates to the eﬀectiveness of capital
controls. Indeed, the global reach of the crisis re-energized the contentious de-
bate on the beneﬁts of international ﬁnancial integration, with some countries
1The empirical literature on domestic banking sector competitiveness has explored its
implications for economic growth (Claessens and Laeven, 2005; Cetorelli, 2001), access to
ﬁnance (Beck et. al, 2004) and stability (Boyd et. al., 2007; Boyd and Nicola, 2005; Allen
and Gale, 2004; Hartmann and Carletti, 2002).
1resorting to capital controls to manage capital inﬂows in the wake of the crisis.
On October 20, 2009, Brazil became the ﬁrst emerging market to tighten capital
controls after the crisis, with the re-introduction of Imposto sobre Opera¸ c˜ oes
Financeiras (IOF), a 2% tax on all foreign purchases of Brazilian ﬁxed and vari-
able rate instruments. Furthermore, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
staﬀ reversed a longstanding position of supporting unfettered ﬁnancial open-
ness to endorse capital controls in response to surges in capital inﬂows (Ostry
et. al., 2010). I ﬁnd that for emerging and developing markets, capital controls
play a small role in determining price convergence with the rest of the world.
While there is a large literature on measuring the eﬀectiveness of capital
controls, it has thus far been dominated by country-speciﬁc studies (Magud
and Reinhart, 2006; Garcia and Carvalho, 2006). This paper uses a broad
panel of economies and a novel measure of de-facto integration that measures
the impact of controls on price diﬀerentials. The de-facto integration measure
is based on deviations from covered interest parity and therefore excludes price
diﬀerentials due to currency risk.2 It also captures both the average equilibrium
price diﬀerentials induced by frictions like capital controls and the speed with
which disequilibrium diﬀerentials are arbitraged away.
Taken together, the results in the paper indicate that for emerging and de-
veloping economies, ﬁnancial sector competition is at least as important than
de-jure openness (or capital controls) in determining de-facto integration. This
has important implications for our understanding of the beneﬁts and costs of
ﬁnancial integration. For instance, recent literature has failed to ﬁnd an unam-
biguous link between de-jure openness and economic growth.3 It has, therefore,
focussed on the possibility that ﬁnancial development serves as a catalyst in the
relationship between ﬁnancial integration and growth. This literature argues
that a minimum level of ﬁnancial development is a pre-condition to beneﬁtting
from ﬁnancial integration. The results of this paper suggest that one of the rea-
2See Ito and Chinn, 2007 for a panel study of determinants of de-facto integration based
on deviations from uncovered interest parity.
3See Kose et. al. (2009), Obstfeld (2009) and references therein.
2sons the literature has not been able to ﬁnd a strong link between openness and
growth could be that we have been using a poor measure of openness (capital
controls). The results here also suggest that lack of competitiveness may pre-
vent countries from reaping the beneﬁts of ﬁnancial integration simply because
it prevents them from being integrated in a meaningful way - that is, achieving
price equalization.
The next section provides some theoretical background for a link between
bank competitiveness and international ﬁnancial integration. Section 2 explains
the construction of the index of integration. Section 3 discusses the macroe-
conomic variables used to explain de-facto integration. Section 4 presents the
results and section 5 concludes.
1 What links banking sector competition and
international price convergence?
In the absence of capital controls and any kind of friction such as asymmetric
information that prevents all domestic participants from accessing foreign mar-
kets and vice versa, price-convergence with international ﬁnancial markets will
occur, irrespective of the structure of domestic ﬁnancial markets. It is only when
either capital controls or some other frictions are present (as in the real world)
that the structure of the domestic ﬁnancial market becomes relevant. Freixas
and Holthausen (2005) show that even with fully liberalized capital accounts,
asymmetric information between domestic and foreign markets may lead to a
segmented market equilibrium, with no interbank activity across the borders.
They further show that when an integrated equilibrium does occur, interbank
market integration will not be perfect (the interbank rates will not be equal-
ized), even in the presence of correspondent banking. In their model, the signal
that banks obtain about foreign banks’ type is more noisy than the signal about
domestic banks, leading to an interest diﬀerential at which a bank may borrow
domestically and the interest rate at which it may borrow abroad (or from a
3correspondent bank that borrows abroad to lend domestically). Adding imper-
fect competition in domestic banking sector to their model will exacerbate the
domestic-foreign interest diﬀerentials and may increase the range of possibilities
where a segmented equilibrium is the only possibility.
While Freixas and Holthausen (2005) assume a fully open capital market,
other explanations for the link between domestic bank competition and interna-
tional price convergence assume the presence of at least some capital controls.
When foreign and domestic markets are partially segmented, market power in
the domestic interbank market would lead to greater bid-ask spreads directly
(Khemraj and Pasha, 2008; Pasricha, 2008b) and through its impact on market
liquidity. Carletti, Hartmann and Spagnolo (2007) show that bank consolida-
tion may lead to greater variance in aggregate liquidity demand and Acharya,
Gromb and Yorulmazer (2008) demonstrate that surplus banks may strategi-
cally under-provide liquidity when outside options of illiquid banks are weak.
Several empirical studies of the foreign exchange markets have shown that thin-
ner markets or those with greater volatility have higher bid-ask spreads (Cheung
and Chinn, 2001; Bollerslev and Melvin, 1994). The higher spreads would add
to the measured wedge between domestic and foreign interest rates.
2 Measuring Price Convergence
When markets are ﬁnancially integrated, the law of one price (LOOP) holds;
i.e., all potential agents in domestic and foreign markets (with the same rele-
vant characteristics) will face identical prices for identical assets. In this paper,
price convergence is measured by the index introduced in Pasricha (2008a). The
index compares interest rates on interbank loans across countries. It captures
the size of no-arbitrage band for deviations from covered interest parity as well
as the speed of reversion to the no-arbitrage band when deviations lie outside
the band (and are therefore proﬁtable). The index is constructed on a yearly
basis for 54 countries for an average of 13 years per country4. Previous attempts
4The list of countries and the years for which data is available are listed in Table 1.
4at measuring price convergence in ﬁnancial markets have focused on either av-
erage absolute deviations (Chinn-Ito, 2007), which do not capture the speed
of arbitrage, or the beta-convergence measure (Baele et. al, 2004), which cap-
tures integration between a group of countries but does not allow one to rank
diﬀerent countries on their degree of convergence. The index developed here
was the ﬁrst time-varying index that allowed one to rank countries in terms of
de-facto integration and took into account both the size of their no-arbitrage
bands and the speed with which the arbitrage occurs, once it is proﬁtable5.
A recent paper by Levy-Yeyati et. al. (2009) also applies the TAR model on
measuring deviations from LOOP on cross-listed stocks from diﬀerent countries
to study their international integration, although they do not propose a uniﬁed
index. While comparing the price of a domestically listed stock and that of its
depository receipt abroad solves the issue of comparability of the underlying
asset on which LOOP is applied, it raises other issues. As the authors note,
wider average no-arbitrage bands in stocks of one country than those of another
country, cannot be interpreted to mean that the former is less integrated than
the former because lower liquidity of the individual stocks increases its price
diﬀerential between domestic market and the foreign market. While liquidity in
interbank markets also varies between countries, this liquidity is more likely to
be directly a consequence of the international integration of the country and the
capital controls it imposes, than that of any given cross-listed stock. Moreover,
using interbank markets allows one to compare a larger set of countries, over a
longer time period.
2.1 Covered Interest Deviations in the Presence of Fric-
tions
In a fully integrated world with perfectly competitive proﬁt maximizing agents
and no transactions costs or other frictions, the following Covered Interest Parity
5The no-arbitrage band captures the minimum deviation required for arbitrage to be prof-
itable and increases with the size of transactions costs and capital controls.
5(CIP) condition holds in equilibrium:
δt =









where δt is the covered interest diﬀerential, it+k and i∗
t+k are respectively returns
on comparable domestic and foreign assets between time t and t+k. St is the
domestic currency price of foreign currency, Ft+k is the forward rate or the
kth period domestic currency price of foreign exchange delivered in that period.
Since all the variables in the above equation are known a priori, any deviation
from this equality in our model world represents pure proﬁts and therefore
cannot exist in equilibrium.
However, as discussed in Frenkel and Levich (1975) and Pasricha(2008a), in
a world with transactions costs, exchange or capital controls (or risk of such
controls) and/or diﬀerential taxation, the measured covered diﬀerential lies in
a no-arbitrage band, even with eﬃcient and risk neutral markets. This happens
because the econometrician’s measure of the covered diﬀerential, which is based
on the average of the forward and spot rates (rather than the bid-ask rates) and
the average of the interest rates does not capture the actual proﬁts, net of taxes,
and other costs of arbitrage. One should then expect the measured diﬀerential,
ˆ δ to satisfy:
κn ≤ ˆ δ ≤ κp (2)
where
ˆ δ = P






In the above equation, and throughout the empirical part of this paper, the
interest rates are expressed in percent per annum and P is a scaling factor, used
to convert the ﬁrst term into annualized percentage terms.6 The precise forms
of κn and κp depend on the transactions costs and capital controls (as well as
the levels of exchange and interest rates).7 The measured deviations within the
no-arbitrage bands are therefore consistent with equilibrium and with covered
6For example, if the forward rates are of maturity 1 month, then P = 1200.
7These are described in Pasricha(2008a).
6interest parity, and may be unit root processes. Further, when the supply of
arbitrage capital is less than perfectly elastic, due either to quantitative con-
trols, asymmetric information, or imperfect competition in markets, proﬁtable
deviations may not be immediately arbitraged away (Cheng and Cheung, 2008;
Fong, Valente and Fun, 2008).8
2.2 Empirical Model for Covered Interest Deviations
These considerations lead one to the choice of an Asymmetric, Self-Exciting
Threshold Autoregressive Model (ASETAR) model as the empirical model to
estimate the boundaries of the no-arbitrage band (called the thresholds) and
the speed of reversion outside the band. This model is called ‘self-exciting’
because the thresholds are lags of the dependent variable itself, and asymmetric
because the negative threshold is allowed to diﬀer from the positive threshold.
The ASETAR model takes the form:
δt = ρiδt−1 + ǫt for κn < δt−1 < κp, (3)
δt − κn = ρn(δt−1 − κn) + ǫt for δt−1 ≤ κn, (4)
δt − κp = ρp(δt−1 − κp) + ǫt for δt−1 ≥ κp, (5)
where ǫt ∼ N(0,σ2), and κn and κp are the negative and positive thresholds,
respectively. In theory, the deviations inside the band are unit-root processes,
so the model is estimated with ρi = 1. Note that this model implies that specu-
lative activity will push the deviations to the edges of the band, rather than its
center. The hypothesis of eﬃcient arbitrage states that the AR(1) process out-
side the bands be stationary. If the thresholds were known, the model could be
estimated by ordinary least squares applied separately to the inner regime and
outer regime observations. Since the thresholds are not known, they are esti-
mated by a sequential method suggested in Hansen(1999) that yields conﬁdence
intervals for the thresholds. In Hansen’s method, a grid search is ﬁrst made for
a single threshold, yielding a minimum residual sum of squares, S1( ˜ κ1), where
8In rational markets, the deviations would eventually be arbitraged away.
7the function S everywhere denotes the residual sum of squares function. In a
two regime model, the ﬁrst search would yield the stronger of the two threshold





S( ˜ κ1,κ2) if ˜ κ1 < 0
S(κ2, ˆ κ1) if ˜ κ1 > 0,
(6)
and the second-stage threshold estimate is the one that minimizes the above
function, i.e.:
ˆ κ2 = argmin S2(κ2). (7)






S( ˆ κ2,κ1) if ˆ κ2 < 0
S(κ1, ˆ κ2) if ˆ κ2 > 0,
(8)
and the reﬁnement estimator for the ﬁrst threshold is:
ˆ κ1 = argmin Sr
1(κ1). (9)
As a practical matter, the search is conducted over all unique values of the
actual observations between the 5th and the 95th percentiles and is restricted
so that at least 5% of the observations fall in each of the three regimes. When
the model is estimated for every year using daily observations, this restricts the
minimum number of observations in each regime to be between 10 and 12.













The asymptotic (1−α)% conﬁdence intervals for κ1 and κ2 are the set of values
of each such that Lr
1(κ1) ≤ c(α) and Lr
2(κ2) ≤ c(α). Hansen(1999) also shows
that




To construct the Integration Index, Pasricha (2008a) takes into account ﬁve
diﬀerent measures that are derived from the model. The ﬁrst is the bandwidth,
which measures the size of the no-arbitrage band, and is expected to be wider
the greater the transactions costs or the eﬀective controls in an economy. To
capture how frequent are proﬁtable deviations from interest parity, and how
fast they revert back to the band, Pasricha (2008a) considers the following
measures: (1) the percentage of observations lying in the outer regimes, OutObs
(2) the median positive deviation outside the measured band, MedDevP (3) the
median negative deviation outside the measured band, MedDevN and (4) the
third quartile of continuous runs outside the band, 3rdQrt. The more elastic
the supply of capital and the less eﬀective the controls, the faster the reversion
speed9. One could also use the AR coeﬃcients in outer regimes or the half lives,
but the results should be similar. Using the percentage of observations rather
than number of observations takes care of the concern about uneven sample sizes
inﬂuencing the latter. Lastly, medians and quartiles are preferable to average
deviations as they are immune to outliers.
Each of the indicators mentioned above are ﬁrst normalized by subtracting
from them their inter-country mean and dividing by the standard deviation.
This centers the resulting index at zero and also converts the components into
pure numbers so they can be averaged. The normalizations are done separately
for the two maturities, one and three months. For countries for which data on
one of the maturities is not available, the available maturity’s data is used to
approximate for the missing maturity model. The Integration Index for country






9Note that the paper uses daily data, and thus measured deviations are those that were
present at the end of the day.
9where
Ijkt = −
^ Bandwidthjkt + ^ OutObsjkt + ^ MedDevNjkt + ^ MedDevPjkt + ^ 3rdQrtjkt
5
(10)




where k indexes maturity of the underlying contracts (here, 1-month and 3-
month contracts) and K = 2. Xk and σk are respectively, the mean and stan-
dard deviation over all country-time observations of maturity k of X, for X
= Bandwidth, OutObs, MedDevN, MedDevP, 3rdQrt. Equation (11) nor-
malizes each of the variables (Bandwidth, OutObs etc) so that the resulting
normalized variables are numbers and can be averaged.
Since there are no theoretical priors that allow one to assign diﬀerent weights
on the diﬀerent components of the index based on their contribution to ﬁnan-
cial integration, this index uses a simple average. A simple average is chosen for
transparency and tractability. It is based on the premise that greater integra-
tion means both that there are smaller deviations from parity and that these
deviations are arbitraged away more quickly. The negative sign in (10) allows
larger values of the index to be interpreted as greater integration.
2.4 Data and Summary Statistics of Integration Index
To construct the index, interest rates on interbank loans of 1- and 3-month
maturities were used. For Brazil, interbank interest rates were unavailable, so
the Certiﬁcate of Deposit rates were used. The data on interbank rates are
from Bloomberg and Thomson Financial’s Datastream databases for all coun-
tries except South Africa and Columbia, whose rates were sourced from Global
Financial Database (as these were unavailable in Bloomberg or Datastream).
The exchange rate data is from Bloomberg and Datastream. The forward ex-
change rates are onshore forward rates of 1 and 3 month maturities, except for
Chile where onshore forward data was unavailable so non-deliverable forwards
were used. For countries that had adopted the Euro, the exchange rates pertain
to the Euro after January 1, 1999 or their date of accession, whichever is later.
10Table 1 lists the countries and years for which the index is available and
Table 2 summarizes the index for the whole sample and for high income and
low and middle income country groupings respectively (World Bank Classiﬁca-
tion). High income countries have on average, greater integration than low and
middle income countries (0.6 compared to average integration of -0.18 for the
low and middle income group) and lower variability. Figure 1 plots the average
estimated bandwidth for all countries, over the period 2000-2006. As expected,
the estimated bandwidths are very small for high income countries and large for
low and middle income countries. Figure 2a plots the index over time for high
income and middle and low income country groups. The ﬁgure highlights the
fact that the level of price convergence is not static. It ﬂuctuates from year to
year, even for high income countries. Clear evidence of these ﬂuctuations was
provided by the recent ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-08. However, it is important to
keep in mind that the ﬁgure is not based on a balanced panel. New countries
are added to each of the income groups as their data becomes available and this
may contribute to some of the ﬂuctuations, especially since the total number
of countries in the sample is not too large. The large dip in integration around
the year 1998 in the low and middle income countries is due to the Asian crisis
which saw the imposition of capital controls in some of these countries (most
notably in Malaysia). The dip in 2001 is due to Turkey’s ﬁnancial crisis. Figure
2b shows the low and middle income countries’ average integration excluding
Malaysia, Thailand and Turkey. Noteworthy is the large dip in integration in
2008, corresponding to the recent ﬁnancial crisis. Figure 2 also suggests that
while the high income countries show a positive trend in integration on average,
the same is not true for low and middle income countries. Figure 3 plots the
integration index for each of the BRIC countries. An interesting result here
is that India and Brazil reverse their relative standing in de-facto integration,
with India everywhere more open than Brazil, whereas Brazil is more open than
India in terms of Chinn-Ito measure of de-jure openness.
113 Determinants of Price Convergence
This section examines the determinants of de-facto integration as measured by
price convergence. The emphasis is on the relationship between de-facto in-
tegration on the one hand and de-jure capital controls and competitiveness of
domestic banking sector on the other. Greater domestic bank competitiveness
is expected to lead to greater de-facto integration, for any given level of capital
controls. The foreign interest rate is the interest rate that would prevail in the
domestic economy in the absence of capital controls and monopolistic compe-
tition in the domestic economy. The greater the extent of monopoly power in
the domestic market, the greater the disconnect between domestic and foreign
interest rates, over and above that implied by the level of capital controls.
The relationship between de-facto integration and bank competitiveness is
examined in a panel framework:
Indexit = α + βXit + γt +  i + ǫit (12)
where Indexit is the integration index for country i at time t, Xit are a set of
country characteristics detailed below,  i denote country speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects
and t is a time trend. The analysis is done ﬁrst for the entire sample of countries
and then separately for the two groups: (1) High Income and (2) Low and Middle
Income countries. The reason for looking at separate samples is that the high
income countries have very few capital controls and in the absence of market
segmentation that these controls enable, the structure of the domestic banking
sector should not matter for price convergence. The list of countries included
in each group are indicated in Table 1.
For each sample group, panel heteroskedasticity and serial correlation tests
were conducted (Table 5).10. The null of heteroskedasticity was rejected in all
samples. For the low and middle income countries sample, there was evidence of
10Panel heteroskedasticity tests were likelihood ratio tests that compared likelihood statis-
tics from a GLS regression assuming panel speciﬁc heteroskedasticity with an unrestricted
model. To test for serial correlation, Wooldridge (2002) test was applied using the xtserial
command in Stata.
12serial correlation in the errors in all speciﬁcations. Although the serial correla-
tion did not always show up in the sample with all countries in the tests, perhaps
because there is not suﬃcient evidence against lack of serial correlation in the
high income group sample, the regressions for full sample correct for serial cor-
relation. The serial correlation in low and middle income countries may simply
reﬂect the fact that ﬁnancial openness as well as other macroeconomic variables
in these countries exhibit greater persistence. Accordingly, the regressions for
low and middle income countries and for the full sample were estimated using
a Prais-Winston procedure allowing for panel speciﬁc AR(1) correction.11
The explanatory variables, Xit, include measures of banking competitive-
ness, measures of legal restrictions to cross-border capital ﬂows, macroeconomic
variables and measures of transactions costs and liquidity in the interbank and
foreign exchange markets. These are described in detail below.
3.1 Banking Competitiveness Measures
Four diﬀerent proxies were used to measure domestic banking sector compet-
itiveness: (1) the net interest margins, which equal the accounting value of
banks’ net interest revenue as a share of their total assets, (2) bank overhead
costs to total assets ratio, (3) return on equity in the banking sector and (4)
Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), deﬁned as the sum of squares of market
shares of total assets of the top 50 ﬁrms. This index was constructed using
Bankscope data supplemented with information on total industry assets from
Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Details of the data sources for each
of these variables and of HHI construction are in the appendix.
A higher level of each of the banking sector competitiveness measure denotes
greater monopoly power in domestic banking and therefore, as argued earlier,
11The Prais-Winston procedure is an FGLS procedure that uses as the initial value, the au-
tocorrelation coeﬃcient in the residuals from the ﬁrst stage OLS regression to quasi-diﬀerence
the data and estimate the model( and includes a correction for the ﬁrst time period). The
process is iterated until convergence of estimated autocorrelations. See Wooldridge (2006) for
details.
13should be associated with lower de-facto international integration. Neither of
the four measures is a perfect measure of competitiveness. However, each of
these has been used as proxy for the bank competitiveness in the literature.
Banks with market power can charge higher rates on loans and pay lower rates
on deposits (Berger and Hannan, 1989; Hannan 1991) implying that net interest
margins would be higher in less competitive markets. Demirguc, Laeven and
Levine (2003) ﬁnd that regulatory restrictions on banking activity, including
freedom of entry and lack of institutional development substantively increase net
interest margins. They also ﬁnd that the net interest margins increase with state
control of the banking sector, and decline with development of the stock markets,
which would compete with banks as a source of funding. Higher proﬁts of a less
competitive industry may be reﬂected in higher return on equity (ROE) or
higher overhead costs (Berger and Hannan, 1998; Jayaratne and Strahan, 1998;
Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004). The downside of these three measures is that
they may also be inﬂuenced by country tax structures, quality of institutions,
and bank risk preferences. The HHI ratio varies between 0 and 1 and in theory,
is higher for less competitive systems. However, the HHI does not take into
account the fact that banks may compete with other ﬁnancial markets, nor
that threat of entry matters for eﬀective competition (Panzar and Rosse, 1987,
Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Beck et. al, 2006).
In order to account for the competition banks may face from the stock mar-
ket, I use a measure of equity market development, which is the ﬁrst principal
component of stock market capitalization ratio to GDP and stock market total
value traded as ratio to GDP. The data are from World Bank’s ﬁnancial struc-
ture database (Beck et. al., 2006). I include equity market development alone
as well as its interaction with HHI, to allow for non-linear eﬀects.
3.2 Measure of De-jure Openness
While the level of capital controls determines de-facto ﬁnancial integration, mar-
ket players often ﬁnd ways to evade such controls, so the relation need not be
14one-to-one. Moreover, even in the absence of capital controls, other imperfec-
tions - transactions and information costs, asymmetric information, imperfect
competition etc - impinge on the price convergence with international markets,
so that even in the absence of such controls, price convergence may not be per-
fect. Therefore, the coeﬃcient on de-jure measure of openness is expected to be
positive, but may be ‘small’. One measure of smallness of the coeﬃcient would
be that it is less than one in standardized terms. I use the Chinn-Ito measure
of capital account openness (De-jure Openness), which takes higher values for
fewer legal restrictions on capital ﬂows across borders. This measure is com-
monly used in the literature as a measure of de-jure openness and is available
for a large set of countries and time periods.12
3.3 Other Explanatory Variables
The degree of development of institutions in the country may inﬂuence the speed
of arbitrage, particularly when arbitrage involves lending in the domestic cur-
rency. Better institutions imply a lower country risk. Bank competitiveness may
itself be positively related to institutional development (Claessens and Laeven,
2004; Ito and Chinn, 2007). On the other hand, for any given level of capital
controls, lower institutional development, for example, higher corruption, would
allow easier evasion of the de-jure controls. For these reasons, the sign of an
institutional variable (with higher values measuring better institutions) may be
positive or negative. I include a measure of institutional development, which
is the ﬁrst principal component of corruption and law and order indices from
PR Group’s International Country Risk Guide. Higher values of these variables
reﬂect lower corruption or law and order.
As a proxy for transactions costs in currency markets, I compute the percent-
age bid-ask spread (as a percentage of the mean rate) in the spot exchange rate
markets using daily data. An average of these for the year for each currency is
12Another widely used de-jure index is the Edwards(2004) index. However, the Edwards
index is only available through 2004, leading to a serious loss of observations for developing
economies.
15included as an explanatory variable (Exchange Mkt Spread). One would expect
higher average spreads to be associated with lower integration. Similar spreads
on interbank interest rates were not available for most of the countries in the
sample.
Volatility in the prices in a ﬁnancial market may be used to proxy for the
lack of liquidity in the market, as well as for the risk premia. I add to the
regressions a measure of volatility each for the interbank market and for the
foreign exchange market. Volatility in the interbank market is measured by the
average (over the two maturities) of the coeﬃcient of variation in the daily 1-
and 3- month interbank interest rates (Interbank Mkt Volatility). Similarly,
volatility in the forward exchange market is the average of the coeﬃcient of
variation over the year in the daily 1- and 3- month forward exchange rates
(Exchange Mkt Volatility).
Crisis periods often see either new capital controls being imposed or renewed
enforcement of existing regulations. Banking crisis periods, additionally, are
periods of heightened counterparty risk and lower liquidity in interbank markets,
and serve here to control for these risk premia. I include two dummy variables for
crisis periods in the regressions, one for banking crisis and another for currency
crisis. Currency Crisis dummy uses the Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) index
of currency market turbulence (a weighted average of exchange rate and reserve
changes) to identify crisis months and takes the value 1 for years in which there
was one or more crisis month. The Bank Crisis dummy variable takes the value
1 for years in which there was a systemic banking crisis and is taken from Laeven
and Valencia (2008). Both kinds of crisis periods are therefore expected to be
associated with lower price convergence.
Finally, a trend variable is included to test if the world has indeed become
more globalized over time, GDP per capita in thousands of 2000 US dollars
(real GDP per capita) to test if higher income countries are more integrated
after controlling for their level of ﬁnancial development, institutions etc, and
the ratio of trade to GDP.13 Greater trade integration should make it easier to
13Note that since the integration index is an average over normalized variables, it can
16evade capital controls as over invoicing of imports and under invoicing of exports
are popular ways of exporting capital in countries with controls (Aizenman 2008;
Aizenman and Noy, 2009; Prasad and Rajan, 2008; Claessens and Naude, 1993).
3.4 Summary statistics for explanatory variables
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of each of the regressors for all countries
and by income group. Several of the variables have diﬀerent mean values by
income group. Table 4 presents the results of diﬀerence in means tests for some
variables of interest, by income group. High income countries have net interest
margins and overhead costs that are signiﬁcantly lower than low and middle
income countries. Moreover, the correlation between net interest margins and
overheads is 0.62, underscoring the validity of these two variables as proxies for
lack of competitiveness in banking rather than for bank eﬃciency.
The return on equity is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the two groups,
and HHI in ﬁnancial institution assets is actually signiﬁcantly larger for high
income countries than for low and middle income countries. This, combined
with the signiﬁcantly higher level of equity market development in the high
income economies, suggests that HHI may not fully capture the competition
faced by the banking sector. This observation is consistent with the results
of Claessens and Laeven (2004) who create a measure of bank competitiveness
based on contestability of the market and ﬁnd that it is not negatively related
to concentration.14
vary between (−∞,∞). As the diﬀerentials for all countries become smaller, the standard
deviation of each estimated component of the index becomes smaller, leading to larger values
of the index.
14The concentration measure they use is narrower - it is the combined market share of the
ﬁve largest banks.
174 Results on Determinants of International Fi-
nancial Integration
4.1 Full Sample
The estimates from equation 12 are presented in Tables 6 to 11. Table 6 presents
the results for the entire sample. De-jure ﬁnancially open countries are also
de-facto more integrated. The coeﬃcient for de-jure integration is positive,
signiﬁcant and roughly the same size in all columns of Table 6. These results
indicate that although capital controls do lead to lower price convergence, the
relationship is far from one to one. A one standard deviation increase in de-jure
openness is associated with a 0.21-0.24 standard deviation increase in de-facto
integration, and vice versa.15 This is consistent with the widely held view
that market players ﬁnd ways around controls and with other studies on the
eﬀectiveness of capital controls.16
Also negative in sign and signiﬁcant are exchange market volatility, currency
crisis dummy and exchange market spread, implying that thinner markets, pe-
riods with greater uncertainty and heightened liquidity or counterparty risk and
higher transactions costs are associated with lower de-facto integration. There
is a signiﬁcant positive trend in integration, indicating that the recent wave of
globalization has led to price convergence.
As far as the bank competition measures are concerned, only net interest
margins and the interaction term between equity market development and the
concentration measure, HHI, enter signiﬁcantly. However, the results here may
be driven by the relationships in high income countries, as roughly 73 percent of
all observations in Table 6 belong to high income countries. While the impact
of volatility or counterparty risk need not depend on the level of de-facto inte-
gration, domestic banking competitiveness matters for international integration
15Maximum and minimum values of the standardized coeﬃcients for estimates in Tables 6
to 11 are in Table 13
16See, for example, Garber 1998, Garcia 2006 and Aizenman 2004 for studies on evasion of
capital controls.
18only in the presence of some segmentation between the domestic and foreign
markets.
The signiﬁcant and negative coeﬃcient on Trade/GDP ratio is largely due
to the fact that most countries that had currency crises in the sample were also
more open to trade (and were richer). The crises periods typically involve a
sharp decline in de-facto integration that outlasts the crisis period. Figure 2c
shows this pattern in Malaysia, Thailand and Turkey. Table 12 lists the mean
and range of Trade/GDP ratio and real GDP per capita for countries that had
at least one currency crises during the sample period (except the 2008 crisis)
and those that did not. Countries that had at least one crisis during the sample
period had average trade/GDP ratio of 0.97 (median ratio of 0.74) whereas
countries that did not have any currency crises had a lower average trade/GDP
ratio of 0.90 (median ratio of 0.70). The crisis countries were also richer on
average.
Further, if trade integration was negatively correlated with de-facto ﬁnan-
cial integration even in non-crisis periods, then the correlation between trade
growth and ﬁnancial integration should also be negative. Countries with faster
trade integration should see their ﬁnancial integration decline. However, such
relationship is refuted by the data. Table 7 shows the regressions results for all
countries when trade growth and GDP per capita growth are included as ex-
planatory variables. The coeﬃcient of trade growth is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero, and that of GDP growth is signiﬁcant and positive. The standardized
coeﬃcients on de-jure openness are now lower, between 0.18-0.21 and those on
bank competitiveness measures are larger.
4.2 Results by Income Group
The results on the high income group are presented in Table 8 and 9. In this
group, the level of de-jure openness and the positive trend are practically the
only consistently signiﬁcant arguments. Both have a positive sign, indicating
that the fewer the restrictions on ﬂows, the higher the level of integration; and
19that de-facto integration has increased over time. Given the high level of de-jure
openness in these countries, and perhaps also the relatively similar underlying
contracts, it is not surprising that most of the banking competitiveness variables
are not signiﬁcant. As discussed in the introduction, when there are no or
few constraints on access to overseas ﬁnancial markets, the level of domestic
banking competition becomes irrelevant. The positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient
on return on equity may only reﬂect greater eﬃciency in these markets. The R2
in the high-income country regressions are also quite low.
In contrast, the R2 for low and middle income country sample are very
high, above 0.5 for each speciﬁcation (Tables 10 and 11). The coeﬃcient on
de-jure openness is positive in all speciﬁcations, but not always signiﬁcant. The
point estimates of the standardized coeﬃcient for de-jure openness vary from
0.09 to 0.22. All the banking sector competitiveness indicators have negative
coeﬃcients that are larger in magnitude than for the full sample. Net interest
margins, overheads and return on equity are signiﬁcant in both tables, while
HHI is signiﬁcant in three out of the four speciﬁcations in which it is included.
These results indicate that less competitive banking systems are in fact, asso-
ciated with lower price convergence with the rest of the world. The standardized
coeﬃcient on net interest margin is -0.4 in Table 10. This value means that a
one standard deviation decrease in net interest margin would lead to a rise in
the integration index of .4 standard deviations.17 As an example, if Argentina’s
net interest margins fell from 0.061 in 2005 to 0.020 which was roughly level of
net interest margins in Hong Kong in the same year (a 1.6 standard deviation
fall) other things being equal, its integration index would rise from -0.26 to 0.18,
roughly the level for Spain in 2003. Moreover, the largest standardized coeﬃ-
cient on net interest margins in Tables 10 and 11 is about twice the absolute
size of the largest point estimate for standardized coeﬃcient on de-jure openness
(0.22). The point estimate of standardized coeﬃcients of overheads equal -0.10,
that for return on equity lie between -0.17 to -0.19 and on HHI from -0.08 to
17In this section, all mean and standard deviations refer to their respective values in the
regression sample.
20-0.16.
The last columns of Tables 10 and 11 explore the interactions between the
two variables in determining de-facto integration. The results indicate that both
higher equity market development and more competitiveness in ﬁnancial sector
lead to greater de-facto international integration on average, though the impact
is non-linear. Estimates in Table 10 indicate that at the mean value of HHI, a
marginal increase in stock market development increases ﬁnancial integration by
a positive value (0.06) but in more competitive systems, the impact is larger. At
mean values of stock market development, a marginal increase in concentration
in the ﬁnancial sector reduces de-facto integration by 1.74.
Currency crisis are associated with lower de-facto integration. The coeﬃcient
is always negative and signiﬁcant. Greater volatility in the interbank and for-
eign exchange markets are associated with lower levels of de-facto integration,
whereas ﬁnancial development is associated with higher de-facto integration.
However, these variables are not always signiﬁcant De-jure restrictions matter,
but the coeﬃcients are smaller than for the high income country sample and
not always signiﬁcant.
4.3 Robustness Checks
The measures of banking competitiveness may be endogenous in the regres-
sions. Therefore, I re-ran the regressions with lagged values of these variables
for emerging and developing countries. The results are in Table 14. The main
results are robust to using lagged values. The coeﬃcients on net interest mar-
gins and HHI remain negative and signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient on overheads is
now signiﬁcant (it is negative and higher in absolute value), but the reverse is
true for return on equity. The coeﬃcients on other variables remain about the
same size and signiﬁcance. The main results are also robust to including other
potentially endogenous variables, i.e. volatility in interbank and exchange mar-
kets, the spread in exchange markets, ﬁnancial development, GDP per capita
and GDP growth, with one lag (Table 15).
215 Concluding Remarks
This paper extends a price based measure of ﬁnancial integration to rank 54
countries over an average duration of 13 years per country. This index captures
an important aspect of international ﬁnancial integration - the degree to which
interest rates are aligned with international markets - that has so far been miss-
ing in studies of the impact of ﬁnancial integration on growth, macroeconomic
volatility, as well as contagion. While there is a clear trend of increasing inte-
gration in the high income countries before the onset of current crisis, the same
is not true for the developing countries.
Further, this paper makes a contribution to the literature on determinants
of de-facto integration and looks at a previously ignored angle - the relation-
ship between banking sector competitiveness and de-facto integration. Although
none of the measures used are perfect, they all point to a strong link between
bank competitiveness and price convergence in international markets for low
and middle income countries. Schaeck et. al. (2006) ﬁnd that more competitive
banking systems are more stable and Fecht et. al. (2007) that greater inter-
national integration of interbank markets enhances resilience to idiosyncratic
shocks.18 The link between the two may be that more competitive systems are
also more integrated with the rest of the world. This has several policy impli-
cations. The restrictions on international integration are not the sum total of
controls on cross border transactions - domestic regulations also impinge on in-
ternational integration. Liberalizing domestic ﬁnancial sectors may provide all
the beneﬁts of more eﬃcient domestic allocation of resources, but in addition
would provide the beneﬁts from greater international integration. Conversely,
consolidation of the ﬁnancial sector, that has occurred in some countries since
the 2008 crisis, may lead to larger price diﬀerentials between these economies
and the world markets.
The paper also ﬁnds that the for high income countries, domestic banking
18Although, as the 2007-08 crisis made clear, it may also increase vulnerability to systemic
shocks.
22sector competitiveness is not an important determinant of de-facto international
integration. Other determinants of de-facto international integration also diﬀer
between developed and developing countries. Periods of volatility and currency
crisis are periods of low price-integration for developing countries. Moreover, for
this group, while the link between capital controls and price-convergence exists,
it is less than perfect, providing evidence that capital controls do get evaded.
Data limitations do not allow us to explore fully the possible threshold ef-
fects. Increasing trade openness may increase convergence but only when the
level of de-jure controls are high and when corruption is high, i.e. when there
is an incentive to evade controls and a means to do so. The impact of tighten-
ing of capital controls on de-facto integration may also depend on the level of
institutional development. These remain a topic for future research.
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28Table 1. Integration Index Availability
Market N Begin Year End Year
High Income
Australia 23 1986 2008
Austria 20 1989 2008
Belgium 19 1990 2008
Canada 24 1985 2008
Czech Republic 12 1997 2008
Denmark 21 1988 2008
Estonia 10 1999 2008
Finland 17 1992 2008
France 20 1989 2008
Germany 18 1991 2008
Greece 12 1997 2008
Hong Kong 23 1986 2008
Iceland 5 2004 2008
Ireland 20 1989 2008
Israel 8 2001 2008
Italy 18 1991 2008
Japan 13 1996 2008
Kuwait 7 2002 2008
Netherlands 20 1989 2008
New Zealand 23 1986 2008
Norway 23 1986 2008
Portugal 16 1993 2008
Saudi Arabia 7 2002 2008
Singapore 23 1986 2008
Slovenia 5 2004 2008
Spain 20 1989 2008
Sweden 22 1987 2008
Switzerland 25 1984 2008
United Arab Emirates 2 2007 2008
United Kingdom 25 1984 2008
Low and Middle Income
Argentina 5 2004 2008
Brazil 6 2003 2008
Bulgaria 5 2004 2008
Chile 7 2002 2008
China 7 2002 2008
Colombia 5 2004 2008
Croatia 6 2003 2008
Hungary 11 1998 2008
India 10 1999 2008
29Table 1 (cont’d)
Market N Begin Year End Year
Indonesia 9 2000 2008
Kazakhstan 5 2004 2008
Latvia 8 2001 2008
Lithuania 9 2000 2008
Malaysia 19 1990 2008
Mexico 12 1997 2008
Pakistan 5 2004 2008
Philippines 12 1997 2008
Poland 10 1999 2008
Romania 5 2004 2008
Russian Federation 5 2004 2008
Slovakia 7 2002 2008
South Africa 12 1997 2008
Thailand 13 1996 2008
Turkey 10 1999 2008
Total 704 1984 2008
Note. — N is the total number of observations.
30Table 2. International Integration Index: Summary Statistics
N Mean Std Dev Max Min CV
All Countries 704 0.00 0.48 0.54 -4.88 ..
High Income Countries 519 0.06 0.33 0.54 -2.20 5.32
Low and Middle Income Countries 185 -0.18 0.73 0.50 -4.88 -4.11
Note. — N is the total number of observations, Std Dev is the standard deviation
of each variable, Max is the maximum value, Min is the minimum value, and CV is
the coeﬃcient of variation.
31Table 3. Summary Statistics
N Mean Std Dev Max Min CV
De-Jure Openness 637 1.68 1.18 2.53 -1.13 0.70
Interbank Mkt Volatility 704 0.12 0.11 0.99 0.00 0.88
Exchange Mkt Volatility 704 0.04 0.03 0.43 0.00 0.73
Exchange Mkt Spread 648 0.06 0.09 0.66 0.00 1.42
Institutions 704 0.00 1.31 1.63 -3.26 ..
Trade 681 0.93 0.66 4.57 0.19 0.71
real GDP per capita 702 16.45 10.63 42.43 0.44 0.65
Overheads 593 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.55
Net Interest Margins 593 0.03 0.02 0.18 0.01 0.60
HHI 556 0.16 0.13 0.90 0.00 0.85
ROE 585 0.09 0.14 1.03 -1.44 1.59
Equity Mkt Development 607 0.00 1.33 8.52 -1.27
High Income Countries
De-Jure Openness 474 2.14 0.69 2.53 -1.13 0.32
Interbank Mkt Volatility 519 0.12 0.11 0.99 0.00 0.94
Exchange Mkt Volatility 519 0.04 0.02 0.22 0.00 0.56
Exchange Mkt Spread 490 0.05 0.07 0.66 0.00 1.38
Institutions 519 0.57 0.91 1.63 -1.91 1.59
Trade 497 0.96 0.72 4.57 0.19 0.75
real GDP per capita 517 21.11 8.33 42.43 3.75 0.39
Overheads 433 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.52
Net Interest Margins 433 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.39
HHI 389 0.18 0.15 0.90 0.00 0.85
ROE 425 0.09 0.10 1.03 -0.50 1.19
Equity Mkt Development 444 0.14 1.41 8.52 -1.27 10.44
Low and Middle Income Countries
De-Jure Openness 163 0.33 1.26 2.53 -1.13 3.82
Interbank Mkt Volatility 185 0.13 0.09 0.46 0.00 0.71
Exchange Mkt Volatility 185 0.04 0.04 0.43 0.00 0.99
Exchange Mkt Spread 158 0.09 0.12 0.66 0.00 1.29
Institutions 185 -1.61 0.81 0.28 -3.26 -0.50
Trade 184 0.85 0.46 2.20 0.25 0.55
real GDP per capita 185 3.43 1.99 9.89 0.44 0.58
Overheads 160 0.04 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.52
Net Interest Margins 160 0.05 0.03 0.18 0.01 0.56
HHI 167 0.11 0.07 0.37 0.00 0.59
ROE 160 0.08 0.21 1.01 -1.44 2.46
Equity Mkt Development 163 -0.37 0.97 3.51 -1.26 -2.64
Note. — GDP per capita is in thousands of 2000 US dollars. N is the total
number of observations, Std Dev is the standard deviation of each variable, Max
is the maximum value, Min is the minimum value, and CV is the coeﬃcient of
variation.
32Table 4. Diﬀerence in Means Tests
T-Statistic P-Value Total Observations
Net Interest Margin 10.28 0.00 593
Overheads 6.21 0.00 593
Return on Equity -0.29 0.77 585
HHI -6.75 0.00 556
Financial Development -4.97 0.00 607
Institutions -30.51 0.00 704
De-jure Openness -17.43 0.00 637
Interbank Rate Volatility 1.35 0.18 704
Note. — The t-test is performed assuming unequal variances between
samples. The p-values refer to a two-tailed test, of the null hypothesis that
the mean of the relevant variable is same between high income and low and
middle income group, against the alternative that the two means diﬀer.
33Table 5: Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation Tests
Model with All Countries High Income Low and Middle Income
LR Test for Heteroskedasticity
χ2- Statistics (p-values) for H0: Panel Heteroskedasticity
Net Interest Margin 507.29 312.20 122.45
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Overheads 516.96 310.05 128.73
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Return on Equity 496.39 293.67 131.63
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
HHI 522.22 288.33 123.56
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Equity Mkt Devpt*HHI 520.62 287.07 123.33
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Wooldridge (2002) Test for Autocorrelation in Panel Data
F-Statistics (p-values) for H0: No ﬁrst order autocorrelation
Net Interest Margin 3.31 1.07 8.94
(0.08) (0.31) (0.01)
Overheads 3.34 1.07 6.84
(0.07) (0.31) (0.02)
Return on Equity 3.34 1.02 6.37
(0.07) (0.32) (0.02)
HHI 1.79 0.08 6.63
(0.19) (0.77) (0.02)
Equity Mkt Devpt*HHI 1.75 0.09 5.89
(0.19) (0.77) (0.03)
34Table 6. Explaining De-facto Integration, I
1 2 3 4 5
De-Jure Openness 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.08***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Interbank Mkt Volatility -0.10 -0.12 -0.13 -0.15 -0.15
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)
Exchange Mkt Volatility -4.13*** -4.96*** -4.98*** -5.04*** -5.06***
(1.18) (1.18) (1.17) (1.20) (1.20)
Exchange Mkt Spread -0.58 -0.67* -0.66* -0.68* -0.65*
(0.37) (0.37) (0.38) (0.36) (0.35)
Bank Crisis Dummy -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 -0.17 -0.17
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11)
Crisis Dummy -0.27*** -0.27*** -0.27*** -0.31** -0.31**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.13)
Trend 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Institutions 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Equity Mkt Development 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Trade/GDP -0.08** -0.07* -0.07* -0.06* -0.07*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
real GDP per capita -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)










Constant -0.09 -0.23* -0.22 -0.22 -0.21
(0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16)
Observations 526 526 516 469 469
R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.29
Number of Countries 52 52 52 49 49
Note. — Regressions use Prais-Winston 2SLS procedure with panel speciﬁc AR(1)
error processes. Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
35Table 7. Explaining De-facto Integration, II
1 2 3 4 5
De-Jure Openness 0.07** 0.08*** 0.07** 0.07** 0.07**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Interbank Mkt Volatility -0.08 -0.11 -0.12 -0.09 -0.08
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13)
Exchange Mkt Volatility -3.62*** -4.30*** -4.26*** -4.05*** -4.16***
(1.20) (1.18) (1.16) (1.19) (1.20)
Exchange Mkt Spread -0.67* -0.75* -0.72* -0.81** -0.77**
(0.38) (0.40) (0.42) (0.38) (0.37)
Bank Crisis Dummy -0.10 -0.10 -0.12 -0.10 -0.12
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Crisis Dummy -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.31*** -0.30***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.11)
Trend 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Institutions 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Equity Mkt Development -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Trade Growth 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.13 -0.10
(0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.25) (0.25)
GDP per capita growth 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Trade/GDP -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.09***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
real GDP per capita 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)










Constant -0.21 -0.36*** -0.32** -0.40** -0.38**
(0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16)
Observations 496 496 486 446 446
R-squared 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.32 0.32
Number of Countries 52 52 52 49 49
Note. — Regressions use Prais-Winston 2SLS procedure with panel speciﬁc AR(1)
error processes. Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
36Table 8. Explaining De-facto Integration: High Income Countries, I
1 2 3 4 5
De-Jure Openness 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.24*** 0.24***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Interbank Mkt Volatility 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.04 0.04
(0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15)
Exchange Mkt Volatility 1.23 1.21 2.14 1.01 1.01
(1.22) (1.22) (1.30) (1.30) (1.30)
Exchange Mkt Spread -0.25 -0.26 -0.24 0.11 0.11
(0.72) (0.72) (0.74) (0.74) (0.75)
Bank Crisis Dummy -0.13* -0.13* -0.12* -0.10 -0.10
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
Crisis Dummy -0.12 -0.12 -0.13* 0.07 0.07
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11)
Trend 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Institutions 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Equity Mkt Development -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Trade/GDP 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.15
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
real GDP per capita -0.03** -0.03** -0.03** -0.03 -0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)










Constant -0.51* -0.53** -0.47* -0.60** -0.60**
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.28) (0.28)
Observations 390 390 380 345 345
R-squared 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.17 0.17
Number of coden 30 30 30 29 29
Note. — Regressions use ﬁxed eﬀects estimators. Standard errors in
parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01.
37Table 9. Explaining De-facto Integration: High Income Countries, II
1 2 3 4 5
De-Jure Openness 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.22***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Interbank Mkt Volatility 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.05 0.05
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Exchange Mkt Volatility 1.57 1.55 2.49* 1.26 1.26
(1.23) (1.23) (1.32) (1.31) (1.32)
Exchange Mkt Spread -0.57 -0.60 -0.52 -0.17 -0.18
(0.74) (0.74) (0.76) (0.77) (0.78)
Bank Crisis Dummy -0.13* -0.13* -0.13* -0.06 -0.06
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
Crisis Dummy -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 0.05 0.05
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11)
Trend 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Institutions 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Equity Mkt Development -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Trade Growth -0.10 -0.08 -0.13 -0.28 -0.27
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
GDP per capita growth 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Trade/GDP 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.14
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
real GDP per capita -0.04** -0.04** -0.04** -0.03* -0.03*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)










Constant -0.47* -0.49* -0.44 -0.60** -0.59**
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.29) (0.29)
Observations 376 376 366 336 336
R-squared 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.16 0.16
Number of coden 30 30 30 29 29
Note. — Regressions use ﬁxed eﬀects estimators. Standard errors in
parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01.
38Table 10. Explaining De-facto Integration: Low and Middle Income
Countries, I
1 2 3 4 5
De-Jure Openness 0.11*** 0.10** 0.08** 0.09* 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Interbank Mkt Volatility -1.20** -1.04** -1.04** -0.94* -0.76
(0.52) (0.49) (0.47) (0.52) (0.49)
Exchange Mkt Volatility -0.58 -3.44* -2.78 -3.60* -3.48*
(1.99) (1.91) (1.77) (1.96) (1.80)
Exchange Mkt Spread -0.25 -0.40 -0.16 -0.17 -0.24
(0.46) (0.48) (0.40) (0.48) (0.41)
Bank Crisis Dummy -0.18 -0.15 -0.11 -0.16 -0.11
(0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.14)
Crisis Dummy -1.87*** -1.85*** -2.08*** -1.87*** -1.74***
(0.54) (0.58) (0.58) (0.60) (0.53)
Trend -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Institutions -0.03 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.05
(0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07)
Equity Mkt Development 0.11** 0.10* 0.10* 0.07 0.53***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.14)
Trade/GDP -0.48*** -0.37*** -0.28** -0.26* -0.32**
(0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.13)
real GDP per capita 0.02 -0.00 -0.03** -0.03*** -0.04***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)










Constant 1.36*** 1.11** 1.06** 1.03** 0.54
(0.44) (0.46) (0.44) (0.51) (0.51)
Observations 136 136 136 124 124
R-squared 0.54 0.50 0.52 0.51 0.55
Number of coden 22 22 22 20 20
Note. — Regressions use Prais-Winston 2SLS procedure with panel speciﬁc AR(1)
error processes. Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
39Table 11. Explaining De-facto Integration: Low and Middle Income
Countries, II
1 2 3 4 5
De-Jure Openness 0.09** 0.08* 0.06* 0.07 0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
Interbank Mkt Volatility -1.35** -1.23* -1.27* -1.08 -0.98
(0.66) (0.65) (0.67) (0.74) (0.69)
Exchange Mkt Volatility -0.77 -3.20 -2.23 -3.09 -3.01*
(2.12) (1.97) (1.85) (1.94) (1.70)
Exchange Mkt Spread -0.50 -0.75 -0.37 -0.34 -0.22
(0.40) (0.46) (0.35) (0.47) (0.43)
Bank Crisis Dummy -0.18 -0.17 -0.10 -0.14 -0.03
(0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15)
Crisis Dummy -1.58*** -1.65*** -1.85*** -1.53** -1.25**
(0.60) (0.63) (0.62) (0.62) (0.54)
Trend -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Institutions -0.09 -0.00 0.03 -0.01 -0.05
(0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Equity Mkt Development 0.10* 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.61***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.16)
Trade Growth 0.24 -0.16 -0.06 -0.24 0.13
(0.51) (0.57) (0.55) (0.56) (0.55)
GDP per capita growth 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05** 0.06**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Trade/GDP -0.57*** -0.48*** -0.36** -0.34** -0.37***
(0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.12)
real GDP per capita 0.06** 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)










Constant 1.50*** 1.34** 1.21** 1.26** 0.51
(0.48) (0.54) (0.50) (0.56) (0.54)
Observations 120 120 120 110 110
R-squared 0.56 0.53 0.55 0.54 0.59
Number of coden 22 22 22 20 20
Note. — Regressions use Prais-Winston 2SLS procedure with panel speciﬁc AR(1)
error processes. Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
40Table 12. Trade/GDP Ratio and GDP per capita for Crisis and Non-Crisis
Countries
Countries with
No Crisis ≥ 1 Crises
Trade-GDP ratio
Mean 0.90 0.97
Range [0.19 - 4.14] [0.32 - 4.57]
GDP per capita
(Thousands of 2000 USD)
Mean 13.09 20.19
Range [0.44 - 40.72] [0.93 - 42.43]
Note. — Crisis countries are those with at least one currency crisis in
the sample (except the year 2008 which is considered a crisis year for all
countries in the sample).
41Table 13. XY Standardized Coeﬃcients
Table 6 Table 7 Table 8 Table 9 Table 10 Table 11
Largest Smallest Largest Smallest Largest Smallest Largest Smallest Largest Smallest Largest Smallest
De-Jure Openness 0.24 0.21 0.21 0.18 0.45 0.35 0.38 0.35 0.22 0.12 0.17 0.09
Interbank Mkt Volatility -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.02 -0.09 -0.15 -0.10 -0.14
Exchange Mkt Volatility -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Exchange Mkt Spread -0.09 -0.11 -0.11 -0.15 0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.12 -0.02 -0.07 -0.04 -0.13
Bank Crisis Dummy -0.08 -0.12 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.11 -0.05 -0.11 -0.06 -0.10 -0.02 -0.10
Crisis Dummy -0.11 -0.13 -0.09 -0.13 0.04 -0.08 0.03 -0.06 -0.39 -0.46 -0.28 -0.42
Trend 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.58 0.43 0.58 0.58 0.08 -0.08 0.00 -0.16
Institutions 0.14 0.09 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.17 0.14 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.00
Equity Mkt Development 0.09 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.79 0.10 0.90 0.03
Trade Growth 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.06 0.04 -0.03
GDP per capita growth 0.31 0.18 0.07 0.07 0.29 0.05
Trade/GDP -0.09 -0.12 -0.13 -0.15 0.37 0.33 0.35 0.31 -0.15 -0.30 -0.25 -0.42
real GDP per capita 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.76 -0.77 -1.03 0.04 -0.07 0.17 0.00
Net Interest Margin -0.16 -0.16 -0.13 -0.13 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40
Overheads -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10
Return on Equity -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 -0.17 -0.17 -0.19 -0.19
HHI 0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.08 -0.35 -0.16 -0.49
EquityMktDevpt*HHI -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.12 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.83 -0.83 -1.06 -1.06
Note. — XY Standardized coeﬃcients are obtained by multiplying the estimated coeﬃcient by the standard deviation of the explanatory variable and dividing by
the standard deviation of the independent variable. Values given here are approximate.
4
2Table 14. Low and Middle Income Group, Robustness Check I: Lagged values
of bank competition measures
1 2 3 4 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
De-Jure Openness 0.08** 0.08* 0.08* 0.08 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Interbank Mkt Volatility -1.29* -1.15* -1.07* -1.12 -1.34*
(0.67) (0.67) (0.60) (0.73) (0.74)
Exchange Mkt Volatility -3.23 -3.02 -3.23* -3.09 -3.62*
(2.08) (2.07) (1.89) (2.03) (1.90)
Exchange Mkt Spread -0.27 -0.59 -0.83* -0.43 -0.14
(0.38) (0.43) (0.43) (0.44) (0.36)
Bank Crisis Dummy -0.13 -0.19 -0.24 -0.22 -0.14
(0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16)
Crisis Dummy -1.65*** -1.62*** -1.68*** -1.65*** -1.25*
(0.63) (0.63) (0.62) (0.63) (0.64)
Trend -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05* -0.05
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Institutions -0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08)
Equity Mkt Development 0.10* 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.30***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10)
Trade Growth -0.04 -0.12 -0.33 -0.08 0.21
(0.53) (0.58) (0.59) (0.56) (0.53)
GDP per capita growth 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Trade/GDP -0.52*** -0.52*** -0.38*** -0.33** -0.32**
(0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.13)
real GDP per capita 0.05* 0.05** 0.01 0.00 -0.00
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)








L.Equity Mkt Devpt*HHI -3.43**
(1.38)
Constant 1.47*** 1.43** 1.19** 1.50** 1.54***
(0.52) (0.56) (0.54) (0.60) (0.57)
Observations 120 120 120 109 109
R-squared 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.58
Number of coden 22 22 22 20 20
Note. — Fixed eﬀects estimators. Serial correlation correction using Prais-Winston
2SLS Estimator. Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
43Table 15. Low and Middle Income Group, Robustness Check II: Lagged
values of potentially endogenous variables
1 2 3 4 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
De-Jure Openness 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.09** 0.08*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
L.Interbank Mkt Volatility -0.02 0.07 0.05 0.17 0.16
(0.53) (0.53) (0.53) (0.58) (0.57)
L.Exchange Mkt Volatility -4.03*** -4.45*** -4.84*** -4.28*** -3.37***
(1.25) (1.18) (1.33) (1.20) (1.18)
L.Exchange Mkt Spread 0.72** 0.72* 0.56 1.13*** 1.14***
(0.37) (0.37) (0.39) (0.35) (0.33)
Bank Crisis Dummy -0.12 -0.12 -0.21 -0.13 -0.01
(0.15) (0.14) (0.17) (0.15) (0.14)
Crisis Dummy -1.74*** -1.73*** -1.65*** -1.65*** -1.83***
(0.62) (0.60) (0.58) (0.62) (0.57)
Trend -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06* -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Institutions 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
L.Equity Mkt Development 0.09 0.09 0.07 -0.01 0.35***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12)
Trade Growth 0.10 0.10 0.01 0.32 0.61
(0.52) (0.52) (0.54) (0.51) (0.52)
L.GDPpcgr 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Trade/GDP -0.33*** -0.36*** -0.27** -0.17 -0.19
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.13)
L.real GDP per capita -0.01* -0.00 -0.01 -0.03*** -0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)








L.Equity Mkt Devpt*HHI -3.74***
(1.29)
Constant 1.21** 1.25** 1.09* 1.48** 0.88
(0.59) (0.59) (0.57) (0.61) (0.61)
Observations 114 114 114 104 104
R-squared 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.40 0.44
Number of coden 21 21 21 19 19
Note. — Fixed eﬀects estimators. Serial correlation correction using Prais-Winston
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Figure 3: . Integration Index, BRICs.
47Appendix
Data Sources
Variable Name Description & Source
HHI Sum of squared shares of top 50 ﬁrms in industry assets. Indi-
vidual ﬁrm data was collected from bankscope on all banks (com-
mercial, savings, cooperative and islamic), bank holding compa-
nies and investment banks. Consolidated statements were used
where available. Bankscope provides data on individual ﬁrms and
to compute the share of each ﬁrm in industry assets, the ﬁrm
level data was aggregated for each country-year observation. The
coverage of bankscope data is uneven, due to which some ﬁlters
were applied. First, wherever BIS data on industry assets was
available (and larger than bankscope totals), the BIS data was
used. Second, (country-year) observations where industry assets
or number of banks available were less than the 1st percentile
of all observations were dropped. Third, observations for which
there were extreme changes in number of banks or industry assets
(outside the (1 99) percentile range) were dropped. For example,
if the number of banks in the next year jumped by an extremely
large value, the current year’s observations were dropped, but if
the next year’s number of banks was unusually lower than the
current year’s then the next year’s observations were dropped.
The percentiles were deﬁned for the whole sample (all country-
year observations). Finally, the same extreme value and extreme
changes ﬁlters were applied to the HHI. In cases where the result-
ing HHI series had gaps, the data was interpolated using linear
interpolation.
Source: BvDep’s Bankscope database and Bank for International
Settlements
Bank Crisis Dummy Variable, 1 if the year is a banking crisis year.
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2008)
Currency Crisis Dummy Variable, 1 if the year has a crisis month. Crisis month
identiﬁed as months where an index of currency market pres-
sure (deﬁned as a weighted average of exchange rate and reserve
changes) exceeds the mean by 3 or more standard deviations, as
in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). Data on exchange rates, in-
ﬂation rates and reserve assets from IMF International Financial
Statistics database.
De-jure Openness Chinn Ito (2007) measure of de-jure openness, higher values indi-
cate greater legal restrictions on ﬂows of capital.
48Data Sources (contd.)
Variable Name Description & Source
Exchange Mkt Spread Yearly average of daily closing bid-ask spread on the spot
exchange rate, as a percentage of the mean rate.
Source: Thomson Financial’s Datastream
Exchange Mkt Volatility Average of the within-year coeﬃcient of variation in 1 and
3 month forward exchange rates.
Source: Bloomberg and Datastream
Equity Mkt Development Equity market development index, constructed as ﬁrst prin-
cipal component of stock market capitalization and stock
market value traded as % of GDP. Higher values indicate
greater development.
Source: Beck et. al. (2000)
Index Integration index constructed using TAR models on CIP
diﬀerentials. The index is centered at 0 and higher values
indicate greater openness. The US is assumed to be the
home country in the construction of CIP deviations. Diﬀer-
entials are based on onshore forward rates, except for Chile,
where NDF rates were used. The daily data on onshore for-
ward rates, spot rates and interbank interest rates on 1 and
3 month maturity loans are from Bloomberg, Datastream
and Global Financial Database. Closing prices used in all
calculations.
Institutions Institutional variable, ﬁrst principal component of ICRG
Corruption and Law and Order indices.
Source: PRG International Country Risk Guide.
Interbank Mkt Volatility Average of the within-year coeﬃcient of variation in 1 and
3 month interbank interest rates.
Source: Bloomberg, Global Financial Database and Datas-
tream
Net Interest Margin. Net Interest Margins in Banking. This variable equals the
accounting value of banks’ net interest revenue as a share
of its total assets.
Source: Beck et.al (2000)
Overheads Accounting value of a country’s banks’ overhead costs as a
share of their total assets.
Source: Beck et. al. (2000)
real GDP per capita Per capita GDP in thousands of 2000 USD.
Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
Return on Equity (ROE) Banks’ return on equity.
Source: Beck et.al. (2000)
Trade Trade as % of GDP.
Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators
database
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